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In January 1942, an article by an elderly member of the Dutch Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging 
(National Socialist Movement, NSB), appeared in the party weekly, Volk en Vaderland. The 
anonymous member reported that he had been a fascist since before 1914: ‘For already then I was 
burdened with the realisation that our entire culture had degenerated’.1 To his mind it was the 
Great War which brought degeneration to a crisis, but also a cure: fascism. The time had come ‘to 
no longer stand and worry alone about the threatening downfall of the Netherlands and Europe’.2 
In 1931, Anton Mussert founded the NSB, after a number of failed attempts by fascists to 
create a unified movement in the 1920s. Though Mussert’s respectability appalled more radical 
fascist organisations like the General Dutch Fascist Union or Black Front, the NSB soon outgrew all 
other fascist parties in the Netherlands.3 In the 1935 Provincial Elections it won more than 300 000 
votes, a spectacular 7.94%.4 Against a background of economic depression and dysfunctional 
cabinets, the NSB exploited the socially notoriously divided nation, portraying itself as the saviour 
of the Netherlands, intervening when the ruling Catholic-Calvinist coalition seemed reduced to 
ineffectual bickering, while Bolshevism threatened. The nation was in decline, verval, and faced 
collapse. A sense of decline is commonly associated with the fin de siècle, but there is much 
evidence to suggest that despair about the future of Europe was even stronger after the First World 
War.5 For instance, Richard Overy has argued that the ‘fin de siècle consciousness’, the morbid view 
of the West, civilisation as a moribund organism, was even more current by 1939 than it was in 
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1914.6 In 1935 the respected Dutch historian and cultural critic Johan Huizinga published In the 
Shadows of Tomorrow, which analysed the degeneration of morality and politics caused by the 
onset of modern mass culture.7 Fear of decline in the interwar Netherlands was quite mainstream,8 
and the NSB was in a strong position to exploit it, as an outsider that could break up the pillarised 
political system that defined Dutch politics, and make a plausible claim to being an anti-liberal 
party of unity. 
The controversy around Roger Griffin’s ‘New Consensus’ has brought themes of rebirth in 
fascist political culture to the fore in the past two decades, but its implicit counterpart – decline – 
remains largely unexamined in its own right.9 Arguing in the early 90s that European fascism was 
best understood generically as a political ideology centred on the myth of ultra-nationalist rebirth, 
Griffin aroused a debate about fascist myths and ideology at a time when political-cultural history 
was trending in fascism studies.10 While Griffin has produced extensive work on the fascist sense of 
a new beginning, the sense of decline has often been assumed to be merely a continuation of fin de 
siècle cultural pessimism.11 Historians of fascism like Robert O. Paxton or Stanley G. Payne have 
produced accounts of the fascist obsession with decline, but reductively treated it as symptomatic 
of national crises; the origin of the more important dialectical palingenetic response which was 
the impetus to ideological action.12 Other scholars like Aristotle Kallis have analysed how fascist 
myths, such as decline and rebirth, fed immediately into fascist political action, with real and 
deadly effects.13 But the substance and the production of these myths require further exploration. 
Decline is a concept that covers a rich variety of narratives. Figures like Nietzsche or Spengler are 
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too often used to quickly summarise a mythic mainstay of interwar fascism that was in reality 
ideologically complex and highly varied. At the same time the origins and practical processes 
behind the construction of these narratives remains to be researched, especially among non-
regime movements. The NSB was by no means the only fascist organisation in the Netherlands, 
but it was by far the largest, and the only legal political party during the German Occupation, 
making it a good case study for comparative analysis. Groups like the NSB are still at times 
dismissed by scholars, as negligible and ‘mimetic’.14 
 This article focuses on narratives of decline in the NSB during its existence from 1931 to 
1945, arguing that these mythic narratives gave the NSB an ideological coherence which Dutch 
historians have frequently argued the movement lacked.15 Narratives of decline fulfilled several 
functions within the party. This case study shows that, if we foreground the mythic aspects of 
fascism, they quickly reveal themselves as unique and ideologically complex organisations, whose 
relations with other European fascists, especially Italy and Germany, were by no means 
unidirectional or straightforward. The motif of decline reveals the NSB not as partaker of a 
common or generic fascist myth, but as an heir of Dutch liberal-historicist traditions, of immediate 
importance to its fate.  
 
I 
Under Anton Adriaan Mussert (1894-1946), Leider of the NSB, there was no need for rigid 
ideological conformity. A former member of the liberal conservative Vrijheidsbond [Freedom 
Union], his work as civil engineer of water management in Utrecht (1920-1934) brought him into 
nationalist politics when the 1925 Belgian Treaty unexpectedly united water management with 
nationalist politics.16 The treaty allowed Belgian access to the Moerdijk channel via Antwerp, and 
under the treaty, supported by France, the right to pass through the channels with war ships if 
necessary. Mussert became a leading figure in the nationalist protest against the treaty, which was 
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abandoned under the pressure.17 Success in politics eventually led Mussert, a ‘thoroughly decent 
and respectable bourgeois’,18 to found the National Socialist Movement in December 1931, together 
with his colleague Cornelis van Geelkerken.19 Some Dutch historians have claimed Mussert’s 
version of National Socialism only had style and appearance in common with ‘real’ fascism.20 
When pushed to develop ideological doctrine, Mussert proclaimed Dutch National Socialism to 
have Three Sources: faith in God; love of People and Fatherland; respect for Labour. No doubt a 
liberal interpretation of National Socialism, he meant there were many aspects to National 
Socialism, ‘like a jewel with many facets’.21 
Thus it should come as no surprise that different – even conflicting – ideologies bloomed 
in the NSB, just as divergent narratives of decline also proliferated.22 These narratives underpinned 
ideological positions in the NSB, highlighting ideological difference. The Hegelian faction, headed 
by van Lunteren, is an interesting case of specific narratives of decline in the NSB. Van Lunteren’s 
influence in Volk en Vaderland [VoVa] was noticeable from the moment he became editor in May 
1933, particularly due to his promotion of the Dutch Hegelian philosopher G.J.P.J. Bolland.23 
Bolland’s proverbs were placed in spare spaces between columns, with advertisements for the 
annual meeting of the Bolland Society (free entrance for NSB members).24 A peculiarly Hegelian 
construction of decline stood out. VoVa consolidated the symptoms of decline into a ‘general crisis 
in the process of current world history’.25 The crisis expressed itself as a struggle of ideologies: 
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We, as a nation, have to move through the world completely independently, but in 
doing so we have to participate in the battle of ideologies, in the process of the 
(West-European) World Spirit. […] The spiritual life of the Netherlands is luckily not 
yet petrified in all segments of the population…’26 
 
While such a narrative easily incorporated popular themes like the fall of democracy and the rise 
of Communism, the Hegelians clothed them in theoretical garb. But notions like the World Spirit 
had little appeal to most NSB members, who frequently found the articles unreadably boring, so 
that such theorising was soon relegated to less popular NSB periodicals.27 
Another example of the distinctive nature of the decline narratives that thrived in NSB 
discourse is Robert van Genechten, editor of Nieuw Nederland, and head of the party Department 
of Education.28 Though himself a former lawyer and university teacher, he enjoyed attacking the 
universities as sites of intellectual chaos, especially humanistic Leiden.29 Humanism was his 
personal obsession, and shaped much of his writing; especially during the German Occupation: 
‘[National Socialism] does not lament the downfall of humanist culture, for it knows that it 
undermined the people’s power’.30 Genechten’s concern also shaped the departmental material he 
wrote, such as a 1941 booklet for internal education, listing the ‘cardinal sins of the modern era’: 
first and foremost humanism, followed by modernism, rationalism, individualism, materialism, 
and democracy.31  
 The ideological faction which eventually proved most important to the NSB was that of 
the volkse [racial] fascists, heavily influenced by German Nazism. People like E.J. Roskam, 
agricultural expert; Hendrik Feldmeijer, future leader of the Dutch SS; and the Austrian-Dutch 
Rost van Tonningen, a friend of Himmler, who joined the NSB at his behest, employed notions of 
bloed en bodem, and viewed state and volk as antithetical.32 From the 1935 onwards the volkse 
faction grew stronger in the NSB. Consequently, Jews took an increasingly prominent place in 
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official NSB discourse as the villains in the Dutch story of decline. In 1937, VoVa articles warned of 
Jews in the Netherlands, and the traditional Marxist enemy became a mere precursor to Jewry in 
the narrative of decline: ‘Marxism prepares the path for Jewish domination’.33 In 1938 there was a 
sharp increase in anti-Semitic rhetoric in VoVa, and the theme of International Jewry and 
German-Jewish refugees came to the fore.34 But non-volkse decline narratives not only persisted 
alongside, but in combination with volkse narratives. One speech at a 1938 rally provides an 
excellent example:  
 
Also under the worst possible state form a people does not perish immediately. It 
becomes sick, it languishes, it shrivels, gradually it necrotises, it is as if it were 
rotting away. This process can last tens, sometimes hundreds of years, but the end 
is death, usually through a blow from outside, unless it comes to its senses.35 
 
The speaker proceeded to state that this process of decay had affected the Germanic people for 
centuries, emphasising an ideological shift that had taken place in the NSB: the victim of decline 
was the volk, not the nation, and the volk was Germanic, and as such part of Europe, rather than a 
nation-state. The people needed to be prepared to fulfil its task in Europe, during the last stage of 
the ‘liberal, democratic, capitalist, marxist state’.36 
 
II 
While decline narratives functionally highlighted ideological disparity, they paradoxically also 
served to tie differences together into a coherent political message about the contemporary state 
of the Netherlands. For this purpose Volk en Vaderland was the principal tool. It was widely taken 
for granted that whoever wanted to know the NSB, should first of all read VoVa.37 The high sales of 
the weekly newspaper were attributed not least to Mussert’s editorials, which granted it a special 
air of authority compared to other NSB publications, none of which sold nearly as well. The Dutch 
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daily newspapers usually got their information about the movement from VoVa.38 The Department 
of Press and Propaganda valued the paper immensely: ‘It is known that VoVa is still one of our best 
propaganda tools’, according to the head of distribution in Haarlem.39 The NSB put a staggering 
amount of organisation and resources into propaganda, and VoVa was the core of that effort. At a 
1944 meeting between Mussert and NSB District Leaders he still insisted, while the Allies were 
invading the Netherlands, that ‘[o]ne thing of great importance is the edition of “VoVa”. You must 
ensure that they are delivered.’40 Nevertheless, by June 1944, one District Leader had to confess 
that VoVa sales were decreasing due to material shortages, while distributors found it difficult to 
get around without bicycles, since no new tires could be provided. Many copies were bought just 
to pack fish or flowers.41 But before its last years the newspaper managed to reach hundreds of 
thousands, as excellent organisation, financial resources, and media interest, ensured its message 
percolated through large portions of the Dutch population. 
Considering VoVa’s role within the NSB’s propaganda apparatus, it was crucial in the 
propagation of the movement’s narratives of decline. The format of a weekly newspaper proved 
ideally suited to the narratives’ construction. Naturally a news-focused paper, it was well-suited to 
injecting the ideas of decline that circulated in the Netherlands and Europe with immediate 
relevance. Issues of VoVa were focused on particular themes to drive home the message of the 
week effectively. Numerous circulars have survived from the Department of Press and Propaganda 
which instructed the editorial team and the writers on the weekly topics, and what arguments to 
make, to ensure a common party line. For instance the week after 11 January 1936, the topic was 
the failures of Prime Minister Hendrik Colijn, and their origins in the growing ‘fission fungus’, 
which threatened to ‘suffocate the last remnants of national unity and power’. The ‘demo-liberal 
establishment’, individualism, and universal suffrage were to be highlighted as the origins of 
national division and weakness.42 For the 7 March, the topic was Franco-Belgian influence on the 
‘democratic’ rulers, and ‘COMMUNISM AT THE GATES!’.43 
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While VoVa recycled many of the themes of decline found in rightist discourse since the 
early 1920s – unsurprisingly as many NSB top figures had been active fascists in the previous 
decade – it integrated them with nationally specific topics. Thus, while VoVa employed the 
familiar rhetoric of the powerlessness of the ordinary political parties, apathy, faithlessness, and 
division as symptoms of ‘the downfall of the nation’, it painted a specifically Dutch picture.44 An 
article about one of the NSB’s favourite target groups, farmers, exemplifies this approach: ‘The 
farmer in the Netherlands became the victim of his political alienation… That he was ever capable 
of taking care of himself would be easy to prove, if our government let go its free trade idea…’.45 
Referring to specific laws concerning agricultural pricing and trade regulations, the ‘road of 
suffering’ of the ‘industrious’ farmers was tied directly to the economic depression, unemployment, 
and liberal government.46 ‘[E]very day new victims fall into the maelstrom of insane state 
management. […] In fast tempo everyone goes to the economic abyss, from which they will never 
rise again...’47 Another recurring threat in VoVa’s narratives was the potential loss of the colonial 
empire. (‘The Indies Lost – Disaster Born’, was an oft-repeated slogan in defence of military 
spending.) In 1935, as the Provincial Elections approached – the first in which the NSB participated 
– VoVa attacked the decadence of Parliament, which neglected the Dutch Navy and Air Force, 
threatening to drive the Netherlands off the sea.48 
 The conventional fascist lament of growing national division and conflict, was given a 
Dutch spin by concentrating on pillarisation [verzuiling], the segmentation of Dutch society into a 
confessional and political pillars [zuilen]: Catholics, Calvinists, Socialists, and to a lesser extent 
Liberals. Each pillar had its own political parties, trade unions, newspapers, radio slots, sport and 
leisure clubs, creating a sense of community, and optimising social control.49 As much as ninety 
percent of the Dutch population was to some extent pillarised, even if the efficacy and nature of 
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pillarisation has been questioned in more recent scholarship;50 nevertheless it was a serious 
concern to contemporaries.51 VoVa contrasted the division of recent years with the idealised unity 
of 1914-1918.52 ‘Now behold the result: our people is divided by the party bigwigs into boxes of 
different colours – gone is unity; since then the Netherlands is divided in itself. […] … we despise 
all box-building [hokjesgetimmer]’.53 This sectarianism [hokjes- en schotjesgeest] remained the 
focus for NSB discourse about division until the very end. In April 1945 VoVa still warned that 
victory for the Allies would come at the cost of a return of social division to the Netherlands.54 Due 
to the confessional nature of pillarisation, it was natural that VoVa paid special attention to 
religious divisions, which became a frequent theme in the second half of the thirties, when the 
NSB was under fire from the Churches.55  
 
Decay [bederf] is always and everywhere present. […] There have always been 
people, who abuse their spiritual office to exercise political pressure… But there are 
times, like at the end of the Middle Ages and our time, when business is sanctioned 
by ecclesiastical authorities. … Each collapsing structure has its own forms of 
corruption, determined by circumstance.56 
 
In the same issue VoVa portrayed the political alliance between the Roman Catholic State Party 
and the Reformed parties as a threat to religion. In an article entitled ‘Freedom of Conscience 
under Threat: The Confessional Parties are a Danger to Religion’, it reproduced a speech by 
Catholic NSB Senator Marchant d’Ansembourg.57 The confessional parties had achieved their 
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original objective, ‘the recognition of the Christian foundation of our people’, meaning they were 
no longer needed. Their coalition in parliament entailed democratic compromise of religious 
principles, harming religious morality. Unfortunately the ‘connection of party and Church’ made 
them appear united, and the faults of the party were ascribed to the Church; those who for 
religious reasons did not wish to be part of a confessional party were then regarded as bad 
Christians.58 The article shows more than a little resentment at the treatment of Christian NSB 
members in their respective Churches, but also the stake the NSB had in highlighting pillarisation 
as the ultimate source of division in the Netherlands. It convincingly rooted the narrative of 
division and decline in a phenomenon that was an everyday reality for the Dutch, while 




So far it has been shown that a variety of sometimes mutually exclusive ideological currents co-
existed under the aegis of Mussert, while narratives of decline constructed a more or less coherent 
political message. While VoVa was the principal expression of this function, Mussert also had a 
personal vision of the decline of the Netherlands, and one which left a deep impression on the 
NSB from its inception. What Mussert lacked in theoretical schooling and dogmatism he made up 
for with a myth of Dutch decline which possessed an authority beyond his own, and which 
provided the movement with an ideological constant that rivalled and absorbed all others. 
  The essence of Mussert’s vision was the historical Dutch Golden Age [Gouden Eeuw], the 
glory of the early modern Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century, made great through its 
maritime empire. The Golden Age was invoked by the NSB salute: Hou Zee [Hold the Sea]. A 1941 
NSB internal training booklet explained: 
 
We use the salute which for hundreds of years, in the times of our greatest national 
pride, was used between our Holland sailors. Hou Zee!, the salute of van Tromp and 
De Ruyter [the renowned seventeenth Century admirals], has come forth out of our 
People and its nature [volksaard]… … [Our forefathers] made our flags fly on the sea, 
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they manifested their spiritual power and desire for enterprise, they built the 
imperium for which posterity can now be proud. […] Hou Zee! It is the salute, the 
battle cry, which binds us warriors to the same Dutch ideal. It is the link to the 
glorious past of the Dutch People with the future which we want and will build!59 
 
In one internal speech Mussert spoke passionately about Dutch history and its abuse by the 
establishment: ‘We will teach them to keep their hands off our men, who gave their property and 
blood for the honour of our people, which led an armada [1688], manned with 20 000 heads, and 
defeated France and England simultaneously to clear the path for the future of our people.’60 
Golden Age figures of history were re-interpreted as fascists: artists and poets like Joost van den 
Vondel held up in contrast to the writers of a decadent modern age. Early modern songs 
celebrating the Dutch Republic or William of Orange were invariably sung at rallies.61 A song of the 
paramilitary WA reimagined the corps as sixteenth century Calvinist rebel geuzen reincarnate - 
‘for the blood of their fathers burns in their soul / and they fight again as at Brill’.62 Dutch history 
truly started in 1568, and the narrative of decline consequently spanned centuries, re-configuring 
contemporary troubles to fit in with the story of the lost Golden Age. Present decline was 
understood as the early modern challenges in a modern guise. So the weakness of contemporary 
government was contrasted with that of the Dutch stadhouders (‘Stadholder Prince William II: His 
Significance for Our Time’), while the death of William III of Orange marked the initiation of 
Dutch decline.63 From that moment on, ‘like now’, national leadership was weak, ‘and at the end of 
the eighteenth century entombed our people in the French coffin with pretty slogans, from which 
it arose, sleepwalking, in 1813,  only to, if no great changes take place, finally sink back in this 
twentieth century or the next’.64 
 Harking back to a past Golden Age was conventional enough for fascist movements, but it 
was of definitive significance to Mussert’s perception of the Netherlands, the role of the NSB, and 
his own identity.  He held on to this vision until the very end, his trial for high treason in 1945-46. 
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Defending his collaboration with Nazi Germany, he vainly used ‘an example from history of 
someone who has done greater things than I’. Mussert compared himself to Maurice of Orange 
who in 1607 sought the approval of Henry IV of France in order to continue fighting against 
Spain.65 Being charged with treason, he also likened himself to Johan van Oldenbarnevelt and 
Cornelis de Witt.66 In a letter to his wife, after he had received the death sentence, he imagined 
himself like Hugo Grotius.67 This very personal identification with national history can be traced 
back to the beginning of Mussert’s political career in 1925, when he protested the Belgian Treaty, 
which he interpreted as an act of French imperialism comparable to early modern times, just as he 
would later draw parallels between contemporary events and historical Dutch crises. In the 
vindications Mussert wrote in prison for his actions during the German Occupation, he returned 
to the Belgian Treaty as the defining moment of his political development. ‘A healthy people with 
self-respect does not even get round to debating such an unworthy treaty. It does not even start 
doing so. There was something amiss in our people.’68 
 Thus the NSB preoccupation with France, Belgium, and England as arch enemies in NSB 
narratives of decline should be understood as Mussert’s personal mark. In the first issue of VoVa, 
the paper promoted the ideal of Dietsland – the Greater Netherlands – arguing that Flanders had 
for centuries been ‘the dam that broke the French tidal wave’.69 But, the article continued, now 
treacherous Holland has abandoned her old provinces, and the northern provinces are at risk of 
being ‘erased from the annals of history’, ‘after barely a century of greatness, ruined by three 
centuries of terrible disgrace’.70 A new war in Western Europe was impending, and France would 
consummate her ‘sinister project’, and go yet further than her ‘evil student’, Belgium. The theme of 
a divided nation under threat from historical rivals continued in the 1930s. The issue of ‘political 
Catholicism’, the cynical political exploitation of Christianity on behalf of a foreign power (the 
Pope) explained with the Dutch Revolt:71 ‘No, our teeth clenched, the entire people its hands 
together, [sic] like in the years 1566 and afterwards. Never [will] our land and People [be] under 
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ruthless political Catholicism’, as Mussert wrote in one propaganda brochure.72 During the 
Occupation France had to take a backseat as villain, while England’s role was foregrounded, 
linking Golden Age imperial rivalry to the Nazi struggle against Britain.73  
A speech by Mussert on 1 May 1941 shows that the adoption of a volkse discourse of blood 
and race, and the Nazi attack on ‘plutocracy’, could co-exist with Mussert’s patriotic narrative of 
decline. The speech emphasises how the numerous different themes and motifs of decline that 
Dutch and German fascism had developed could all be tied together into a single narrative. A 
titanic European war of Labour was now being waged against Capitalism and Plutocracy, ‘the 
soulless representatives of a past doomed to collapse’; embodied by the Jews and Churchill. 
Judaeo-English capitalist exploitation was but yet another instance of the centuries-old desire of 
‘bellicose England’ to claim Dutch colonial possessions, and the democrats of the Netherlands 
were their henchmen, exploiting the unemployed and the peasant class under ‘Christian’ 
capitalism.74 ‘In appearance they had power, ha!, yet in reality the democratic rulers in the 
Netherlands were prisoners of English plutocracy.’75 Several other speeches that year repeated this 
narrative. In a manuscript for speeches to be delivered from 20 June to 30 August, Mussert’s 
scribbled notes read: ‘England blackmails Europe. After the death of de Ruyter, sovereign at sea.’76 
In a final rallying speech for the NSB in The Hague, radio broadcast on 7 April 1945, Mussert still 
considered it relevant to invoke the Flemish battle of 1302 to keep the French spirit outside its 
borders, and linked it, once more, to the Belgian treaty of 1925.77 Mussert’s deeply historicist and 
patriotic narrative of the decline of the Netherlands constructed an overarching vision for the NSB 
with a force and conviction other narratives lacked, reinforced by the authority of the Leider. 
Unlike the Hegelian narratives, marred by their academic and theoretical nature, or the dubious 
racial narratives of blood and soil fanatics, it was not blemished by inaccessibility but unfolded the 
fascist world view in patriotic motifs and characters which any liberally-educated Dutchman 
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understood. The drawback was that it risked alienating Catholic sympathisers, for whom the 
history of the Dutch Republic largely meant Calvinist oppression and exclusion, something which 
still aroused strong feelings at the time.78 
 Mussert created a story for the Movement, and integrated and elevated their concerns in a 
Grand Narrative of the decline and fall of the Dutch Imperium. National defence, national unity, 
economic development and trade, freedom of religion – all centre pieces of NSB discourse – were 
lent extra weight due to their place in Mussert’s narrative. It also explains some of the more 
parochial concerns of VoVa, such as the growing disrespect for national monuments and historical 
architecture.79 It is also in this light one should regard Mussert’s efforts and pride in attempting to 
save the eighteenth century Hospitality Tower of Zaltbommel in 1945, for which he tried to 
intervene with Reichskommissar Arthur Seyss-Inquart to prevent the Wehrmacht from 
demolishing it.80 During his trial he would bring up the moment as a symbolic act of love for the 
Fatherland.81  
Mussert’s influence on, and attention to, VoVa is clear by now, and if the ‘face of the NSB’ 
was also ‘the paper of the Leider’,82 then Mussert’s vision must be understood to have a special 
significance for the narratives of decline that did so much to define the NSB in the eyes of its 
followers and the public.83 The assessment of some historians that Mussert lacked ‘clearly outlined 
political ideas’ and had nothing to contribute in this area must thus be heavily qualified at the very 
least.84 As became even clearer during the Occupation, Mussert was by no means ‘a moral and 
spiritual vacuum’.85 
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On 10 May 1940, Germany invaded the Low Countries. After heavy civilian casualties, and the 
bombing of Rotterdam, the Dutch army surrendered on 15 May.86 The Queen and government fled 
to London, depriving the Netherlands of (Dutch) political leadership, with a few notable 
exceptions such as Colijn and Linthorst Homan, leader of the Vrijheidsbond.87 While the flight of 
Dutch leaders was itself a break with the old political order, the rift was complete when Hitler at 
the last minute decided to install a political authority. A Reichskommissariat was established 29 
May, headed by Arthur Seyss-Inquart.88 Though Seyss-Inquart was formally the highest authority 
in the Netherlands, responsible only to the Führer, he was not an omnipotent dictator in his 
fiefdom.89 Instead, the administration of the Reichskommissariat has been described as a ‘Kampf 
aller gegen alle’,90 ‘not a unity, but a conglomerate of individual bureaus’, as both the NSDAP under 
Martin Bormann and Himmler’s SS ensured they had representatives to promote their interests.91 
Through five years of cooperation, intrigue, conspiracy, and quarrelling, this was the Nazi 
administration of the Netherlands. Rauter loyally served Himmler’s interests, and successfully 
attained hegemony for the SS at the expense of the Party and the Reichskommissar by 1943.92 
With the collapse of the old order the NSB suddenly found itself in a radically altered 
position, as structures central to the narratives of decline through which it understood the world 
vanished. Within a matter of weeks its German ideological ally had established a National Socialist 
form of government in the Netherlands, and Dutch fascists no longer found themselves struggling 
against the agents of decline, but instead supporting the Nazi heralds of renewal. As Goebbels put 
it: ‘Today in Europe we implement the same revolution which we have in Germany on a smaller 
scale. It is only the dimension which has changed.’93  
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A crisis of narrative ensued in NSB discourse, as Mussert and his followers were forced to 
reconfigure their understanding of their position in the world. After a brief hiatus, VoVa published 
on 24 May a front page article by Mussert entitled ‘From Old to New: The Netherlands on the 
Threshold of a New Age’.94 The first issue of VoVa since the capitulation is worth looking at in 
detail, to underline the discursive shift in the new narratives that VoVa initially produced, 
particularly in the optimistic days before the imposition of the Reichskommissariat. The issue 
shows a sudden change in style, as news-oriented critical reporting became entirely defunct. 
Instead, Mussert mentions the recent past in wistful phrases redolent with retrospectively ironic 
relief: ‘The democratic arbitrariness and injustice, to which we have been exposed for years, is at 
an end.’95 Rather than lingering on past events, the issue was a forward-looking one, and Mussert 
showed doubts about the future. There was only one future for the Dutch People, a National 
Socialist future, and the People needed the NSB more than ever, according to the Leider.96 
‘Whoever is so foolish as to count on Anglo-French help to bring back the old life, understands 
nothing of the great time in which we live.’97 While not previously averse to overblown biblical 
rhetoric, at this point motifs of Destiny and Providence started to proliferate.  In an article on the 
heroic war effort of Dutch soldiers bravely defending their fatherland, VoVa concluded: 
 
We live in that great, fantastic time, in which the sword of justice has corrected 
history; the chaff has been separated from the wheat. Providence gives us still the 
chance, under the protection of this sword, to put our hands to the plough. Onwards 
then, Netherlanders: after the night comes the dawn!98 
 
The Occupation was a peculiar moment for Dutch fascists, as mythic narratives of decline and 
rebirth seemed to manifest in historical time. Their own roles in the narrative were transformed. 
With the state of decline relegated to the historical past, fascists now moved onwards and found 
themselves in the long-awaited state of renewal. ‘The 10th of May is a turning point in the history of 
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our People. History will from now on always turn on this moment.’99 The mood seems to have 
been shared by the rank and file as well, who appeared to be fully taken in with the new situation. 
NSB members felt the time of decline and hardship lay behind them. One member wrote in her 
diary: ‘The wounds struck in our people will heal. Those who have fallen we remember with 
reverence and gratitude. Now we must build a new future’.100 This sentiment also had a literal 
dimension in the need to repair the damage wrought by the invasion.  Seyss-Inquart’s first decree 
concerned the repair of war damage, so that reconstruction [wederopbouw], metaphorical and 
literal, would become a keyword during the early Occupation period, but would be used by fascists 
until 1945 to denote the sweeping away of the ruins of the old, and the creation of the Nieuwe 
Orde.101 While the national dailies were filled with images of ruined roads, houses, and farms, with 
encouragement to wederopbouw, to fascists the notion had a special significance: the rebirth of the 
Netherlands as a National Socialist state.102 
 However, as months passed and the NSB’s political situation improved, the general mood 
of the population changed for the worse. The States-General was abolished, and instead the 
Germans exercised control through the mayors.  Over time, more and more NSB members would 
be appointed mayor, a dismally unpopular decision as most people regarded them as criminal 
traitors.103 With the restriction of free speech and other civil liberties, unrest grew. In a letter NSB 
regional leader d’Ansembourgh warned Generalkommissar Schmidt of the changes in Dutch law, 
the restrictions and confiscations for the war effort. ‘One experiences these facts with horror and 
indignation, all the more since one has understood from the words of Herrn Reichskommissar that 
the internal political situation would remain untouched. It seems necessary to me to suitably clear 
up this apparent contradiction.’104 As resistance against the authorities grew, they had to 
increasingly rely on the NSB as the only political group willing to collaborate.105 By May 1943, Seyss-
Inquart confessed to Himmler that the manpower provided by the NSB was indispensable, and 
that Mussert himself enjoyed too much support from Hitler who had informally declared him 
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‘Leader of the Dutch People’ in 1942. Within the NSB itself Mussert’s position was too strong to 
dethrone him.106 
Yet the NSB would soon become disillusioned with the Neuordnung as well, and this time 
the ideas of decline would ironically prove a moral rallying point for the Movement. 
Embarrassingly the Japanese occupied the Dutch East Indies at this time, realising a crucial NSB 
fear in March 1942, while to their frustration the Germans took a positive view of the Japanese 
conquest.107 But nothing did more to dispel the myth of regeneration and reintroduce decline into 
NSB narratives than the reality of German rule. Although the only legal political organisation in 
December 1941, the NSB would never be an unequivocal collaborator.108. The five years of conflict 
between the NSB and the SS highlights that the growth of the volkse current within the movement 
indicated by no means a simple hegemony. It was in 1940-45 that Mussert’s Golden Age story of 
decline really came into its own, and was exploited as a rallying myth against the imperialistic 
ambitions of the SS. The two fascist organisations had superficially similar narratives of decline, 
but on inspection it quickly becomes evident that these narratives had very different concerns, 
and that Mussert promoted one antithetical to SS discourse. SS periodicals like Hamer were mired 
in a narrative of the decay of the Germanic peasant-based race, of which the Dutch people were 
but one part.109 ‘Moreover [we] deem it erroneous in this time to first point out in various ways the 
unreal and real differences between us and other Germanic tribes and Peoples. […] In particular it 
has been noticed how many have the inclination to place “The Netherlander” and “The German” in 
opposition to each other…’110 The forces that had brought about the decay of the Germanic Dutch 
were ancient European forces, not national ones: the decadent Roman Empire, Latin humanism, 
the Church, etc.111 Mourning the death of peasant culture, Hamer pointed the finger at the 
‘conquest’ of the countryside by Calvinist preachers, creating a people without Lebensfreude: ‘an 
alien [volksvreemde] life view, which does not belong here and only became possible, because a 
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people forgot its own nature’.112 In the Dutch SS weekly Storm SS, its editor Feldmeijer wrote: ‘The 
greatest part of our People is no longer conscious of its Germanic origins. It no longer knows 
[how] to belong to a race…’113 The essentially pagan and long-term historical perspective on 
decline promoted by the SS in the Netherlands made people jest that the SS thought history ended 
in AD 800.114 As one volkse writer put it: ‘They who think volks, see their people rise and fall across 
the centuries’.115  
This was a view of history that fitted awkwardly with Mussert’s Golden Age vision of the 
Netherlands, so that these opposing narratives of the decline of the Netherlands underlined the 
ideological clash between the NSB and the SS. Some historians have emphasised the similarity of 
NSB and Nazi discourse during the Occupation, speaking of a gelijkschakeling of NSB 
propaganda.116  But the narratives of decline show that while the groups did share a discourse, they 
understood ideological themes of decay, degeneration, national humiliation, cultural decline and 
ultimate regeneration in very different, politically charged, ways. Volkse NSB members were 
overwhelmingly favourably inclined towards the SS, creating sharp internal divisions, but 
ultimately Mussert remained in control. While the NSB could speak of race and a Germanic 
regeneration of Europe against the threat of Asiatic hordes, it was clear that the decay Mussert’s 
supporters really feared was not one of their race, but of the historical sovereign nation of the 
Netherlands. ‘[F]or ‘volk’ is not a biological, but a political concept, and the consciousness of 
“belonging together” is the last word.’117 
Narratives of decline had a tactical application in this unexpected struggle against 
nominal allies. The conflict came to a head in the middle of 1943. In a June speech for the party, 
Mussert spoke of their naivety in regarding every German as a National Socialist and a friend –
some he deemed to be imperialists who wanted annexation rather than create a true fascist 
friendship.118 The Leider spoke of great historical Dutch accomplishments, and the virtues of the 
Dutch Republic: freedom of conscience and freedom of religion, ‘ancient Dutch virtues’ which had 
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a peculiar resonance juxtaposed with a neo-pagan SS agenda.119 Feldmeijer, who informed on 
Mussert for Rauter and Himmler, mentioned the great applause the speech received from the 
audience. He complained that Mussert used a Nazi vocabulary, but twisted its meaning: 
‘Everything calls itself grossgermanisch, and with that means something different altogether. All 
that has to do with Germanics has become a fashionable term.’120 This happened shortly after a 
brief quarrel in the fascist press over an article published on May 7 in VoVa entitled ‘The Judgment 
of History’. The article struck a very different tone from NSB publications two or three years earlier, 
and spoke of the necessary suffering that occurs whenever the new is born out of the old.121 It 
proceeded to apply a familiar tactic: VoVa compared the present state of the nation to the 
historical decline of the Dutch Republic, and likened the ‘current revolution’ to that of the French 
and the Patriot movement of the Batavian Republic. The current revolution ‘makes our own 
revolutionary past of “historical antiquity” come to life once more…’.122 Feldmeijer responded 
furiously in Storm SS: ‘These are the same people, whose National Socialism does not in fact differ 
from that of other bourgeois … who also at every opportunity went on and on again about the 
great and glorious past and about “Us in the 80-Years War”…’.123 When faced with a choice of 
between the Nazi New Order as the rebirth the NSB had been waiting for, and his own vision of a 
return of the Dutch Golden Age, Mussert chose the latter. ‘He [Mussert] has, as before, remained 
the Spieβer and separatist, and in small circles expresses his hatred for the SS at every 
opportunity.’124 
By 1944 NSB found itself in a state of extraordinary isolation. In the last two years of the 
Occupation the administration was almost entirely in the hands of the SS which had managed to 
consolidate its jurisdiction after the death of Schmidt. Anti-Nazi resistance grew among the Dutch 
populace, which increasingly targeted NSB members, including assassinations of the rank and 
file.125. In September 1944 the Allies invaded the Netherlands, causing panic among NSB members 
fearing that bijltjesdag [Retribution Day] had come. As NSB membership numbers spiked 
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following the invasion in 1940, so they dropped as Allied troops closed in and captured The Hague 
(Reichskommissariat offices were moved to Apeldoorn).  
For the final months of the war private letters survive to and from Mussert, which 
addressed the sorrows and anxieties of remaining loyalists, contextualising their suffering as part 
of the grand narrative of decline.  One letter wished the Leider a happy New Year with the wish 
that ‘you may also this year be preserved for the Movement and that you will be spared more great 
disappointments [the September crisis].126 Several letters are from NSB members whose children 
had died in the war, usually as Waffen-SS volunteers on the Eastern Front, and sought consolation 
from Mussert. One letter from Mussert spoke of ‘[a]ll the evil forces that have been unleashed to 
prevent this [the protection of People and Fatherland]; they exist in the N.S.B. as well, and they 
made themselves clearly recognisable precisely after September.’127 In letters Mussert spoke of the 
necessity to experience setbacks to become a true National Socialist, and of the suffering of the 
Dutch people. While he still showed some faith in the final victory, there was little sense that the 
situation would improve. ‘Although our land has now been plunged into misery and the lowest 
point probably has not yet been reached, we keep believing in the final victory, which will bring 
the foundation of National Socialism, through which our people will rise…’ was one of the 
standard phrases with which Mussert now signed off his letters.128 VoVa expressed the same 
sentiment.129 In a speech in February 1944 for District and Circle leaders, Mussert stated that 
‘[e]verything has its origin, rise, and downfall. We merely hope that the downfall will not come in 
our time and if National Socialism wins maybe Europe can still be saved again, for now.’130 
  As the NSB collapsed in the face of military defeat, Anton Mussert, in a final 
speech in The Hague, recognised the reality of the situation, without illusions about a sudden 
reversal of fortunes. ‘Admittedly, our being together here has no influence on the war events 
whatsoever’.131 He emphasised the ordeal of the movement, and of the Dutch people during war 
and occupation, and noted that this ‘vale of suffering’ was a consequence of the political decay of 
the 1930s. But, he noted, there is no Good Friday without Easter, and from present hardship the 
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future is born.  The history of the NSB would know three periods: 1931-1940, 1940-1945/46, and 
beyond that, the full blossoming of the Movement.132 
 
We are now on the threshold of a third period in the existence of our movement, 
that third period, which will give us the much desired opportunity to finally start 
reconstruction. From the ruins of the present a larger, stronger, more healthy Dutch 
people than ever before will re-awaken; that is our calling.133 
 
Conclusion 
Narratives of decline in the National Socialist Movement were not inseparable from the larger 
story of national rebirth. While the meaning of rebirth was vague, decline was detailed and 
elaborate. Taking Griffin’s claim of the importance of palingenetic myth to fascism as a starting 
point, this article has examined one key aspect of that myth in NSB discourse, and foregrounded 
the variety of narratives. Laying bare the different narratives of verval, from the decadence of 
humanism and French revolutionary ideology, through urbanisation’s debilitating effects on the 
race, to the fading glory of Dutch empire, it has become apparent that there was no generic fascist 
understanding of national decay – not even within a single movement. I have also shown the 
importance of the medium of narrative production, particularly the organisation of VoVa, which 
played a key role in strategies of propaganda.  VoVa’s news-driven discourse enhanced narratives 
of decline, and did much to create a sense of Dutch decline, and by extension a Dutch fascist 
solution. Nor were these narratives window-dressing; they represented and produced ideological 
difference. 
 The significance of such differences was foregrounded during the Occupation, when NSB 
collaboration ironically brought Mussert’s followers into ceaseless conflict with the SS. What 
seemed at first like a definitive move towards narratives of rebirth with the establishment of the 
New Order turned out to be a false sense of a new beginning. Relations between foreign and native 
fascists quickly soured as conflicting interests and ideological goals became apparent, and 
narratives of decline proved to be a useful tool in the discursive strategy through which the NSB 
enacted – limited and ineffective –resistance against SS hegemony in the Netherlands. 
                                                                            
132 Ibid. p. 17. 
133 Ibid. p. 22. 




This is an original perspective on the ideological character of the Dutch Movement, which has 
emphasised the link between narratives of decline and fascist ideologies, and qualified the still 
popular understanding of the NSB as an ideologically haphazard movement destined for 
domination by German Nazism. Instead, this study has brought out the centrality of Mussert’s 
personal vision of the decline of the Dutch empire since the Golden Age, its ubiquity in official 
NSB discourse, and its consistency throughout the party’s life span. This narrative of decline was 
an ideological constant which only died with Mussert. While some contemporaries and historians 
have highlighted Mussert’s bourgeois liberal character to question his radicalism, his Golden Age 
narrative of decline grants us insight into the peculiar compatibility between liberal patriotism, 
and radical fascist culture.  
This shows up NSB ideology not just as ‘generically fascist’ in its obsession with decline, 
but as a surprising heir to nineteenth century liberal historic romanticism, not unique to the 
Netherlands. This awkward cultural intersection of liberalism and fascism problematises the 
understanding of fascism as ‘palingenetic’; rather than clearly delineating fascism in interwar 
Europe, it emphasises significant similarities with one of its traditional enemies. In other words a 
sense of decline, and a corresponding longing for national rebirth was not only something shared 
by fascists across the continent, but also with liberal nationalists, a shared mythic language that 
can go some way in explaining the attraction of liberals to fascist movements. Here, rather than 
distinguishing a unique fascist essence, palingenetic myth seems to mix it up in a much wider 
cultural spectrum.  
Europe’s smaller indigenous fascist movements, then, appear less likely to have been 
unilaterally influenced by more powerful role models (Italy, Germany), but also, and potentially 
more significantly, by indigenous political cultures, even ones supposedly incompatible with 
fascism. This could be understood mutatis mutandis as the hybridisation that António Costa Pinto 
and Aristotle Kallis have pointed to,134 but I would caution against regarding the NSB as some sort 
of para-fascist liberal hybrid, and instead heed how contemporaries constructed their ideologies. 
Fascism was an expansive concept for many European contemporaries. Core myths are clearly one 
useful basis for analysing fascism comparatively, but when we examine their production we may 
have to look beyond merely different ‘fascisms’. 
                                                                            
134 Introduction to Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe, ed. by António Costa Pinto and Aristotle Kallis 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 3–5. 
